Why Do Good People Make Bad Choices?

Why do good people make bad choices? A literary reflection on moral judgment, good intentions, social pressure, self-justification and the responsibilities that follow our mistakes.

A concerned woman reading an opened letter at her office desk

The envelope was already on the desk when Maya arrived at work.

Inside it was a letter from a woman whose application for assistance had been rejected. The woman explained that she had submitted the requested documents, spoken to several employees and received different instructions about what she needed to do.

Maya recognized the name. She had handled part of the application herself.

Several weeks earlier, she had noticed that something in the file did not seem right. One of the documents had been recorded as missing, although she remembered seeing it. Correcting the record would have required reopening the case and explaining the error to a colleague who was already dealing with a considerable backlog.

She had been tired. There were other applications waiting. She told herself that the woman could submit the document again.

Now the letter described what had happened in the intervening weeks. The delay had made it harder for the woman to pay her bills. She had taken time away from work to visit the office and had received no satisfactory explanation.

Maya sat for a while with the envelope in her hands.

She had never intended to make somebody’s life more difficult. Indeed, one reason she had accepted the job was that she wanted to help people obtain assistance when they needed it.

Nevertheless, she had made a choice whose consequences were now described on the page before her.

Why do good people make bad choices? The question begins with an uncomfortable possibility: that an individual can genuinely care about doing the right thing and still act in ways that cause unnecessary harm.

Understanding how this happens does not mean accepting that harm. It may help us recognize the circumstances in which our own judgment becomes less reliable than we imagine.

We rarely experience ourselves as the villain

When we hear a story about somebody behaving unfairly, we often encounter the action before we encounter the reasons offered for it.

A person has broken a promise. A decision has disadvantaged somebody who deserved better treatment. An individual has concealed information that would have allowed another person to protect their interests.

From outside the situation, the harmful choice may be relatively clear.

The person making it usually encounters a more complicated collection of thoughts. They know what they were afraid might happen, what other responsibilities were competing for their attention and which alternatives seemed unavailable.

These details can make a decision appear different from the way it appears to the person affected.

A manager may tell themselves that withholding information prevents unnecessary anxiety. A friend may conceal a mistake because revealing it could damage an important relationship. Someone who does not intervene when another person is being treated unfairly may believe their intervention would accomplish little.

Sometimes these explanations identify genuine complications. There are situations in which disclosure would cause unnecessary harm or intervention would put somebody in danger.

But an explanation favorable to ourselves is not necessarily an accurate account of the available choices.

In The Contradictions Within Us, we examined the tendency to interpret our own behavior through circumstances we do not consider when judging others. Here, the problem is particularly consequential because we can use those circumstances to preserve a favorable understanding of ourselves while avoiding examination of what we have done.

Maya had described her decision as a practical response to the workload. The woman receiving the rejection had experienced it as another obstacle placed between her and assistance.

Both perspectives contain information. Neither can simply erase the other.

The good intention that becomes a substitute for a good decision

Imagine a parent who wants their child to succeed at school.

They arrange additional lessons, examine results carefully and offer advice about future opportunities. When the child begins struggling with the pressure, the parent interprets the complaints as a temporary resistance to something that will eventually prove beneficial.

The parent’s intention is not necessarily insincere. They may genuinely believe that educational success will protect the child from difficulties they encountered themselves.

Yet the intention can become a reason not to investigate the consequences of their behavior.

When a person is confident that their purpose is beneficial, evidence of harm can appear less important than the reasons they already possess for continuing.

The parent may hear a request for rest as a sign that more encouragement is required. They may understand anxiety as a difficulty to be overcome rather than information about the conditions under which the child is living.

This is not an argument against having expectations or helping children develop abilities. It is an argument for remaining responsive to the person whose welfare gives those expectations their meaning.

An intention belongs to the person acting. A consequence may belong chiefly to somebody else.

The distinction matters because good intentions do not provide their owners with exclusive authority to interpret those consequences.

Maya had entered her profession for a commendable reason. Her reason remained important, but it could not correct the woman’s file or reduce the expenses that the delay had caused.

Her original commitment would acquire practical significance only through the decisions she was willing to make now.

The choices that arrive disguised as small exceptions

A man responsible for managing a household budget decides to borrow a little money from a shared account without discussing it with his partner.

He intends to return the money soon. The amount is not particularly large, and the expense seems difficult to explain without beginning a conversation he would rather avoid.

He makes the transfer.

The following month, he encounters another expense. Because the earlier amount has not yet been returned, he finds it easier to treat the new decision as part of the same temporary arrangement.

What began as a small exception develops into a pattern.

Eventually, his partner discovers the transactions. The amount of money matters, but so does the discovery that an arrangement believed to be shared has been managed differently without their knowledge.

The man may not have imagined that he would become somebody who concealed financial decisions. He may have regarded each occasion as an isolated response to an immediate difficulty.

This is one reason morally consequential behavior can develop without a dramatic moment in which a person consciously decides to abandon an important principle.

Each step is small enough to be explained. By the time the accumulated consequences become visible, the person has become accustomed to the explanations.

Our earlier essay Why Do We Become What We Once Disliked? explored this gradual transformation in the behavior of a newly promoted supervisor. A related process occurs whenever we allow a temporary exception to become a decision made repeatedly without reconsideration.

The question is not whether every exception is wrong. Rules sometimes need to be adapted to particular circumstances.

It is whether we are still able to explain the exception in terms that the people affected by it would have a reasonable opportunity to examine.

The man might have needed the money urgently. That did not necessarily make secrecy the only possible response.

What pressure reveals about our available choices

A member of a team discovers that a report contains an error.

The report is due that afternoon, and their manager has repeatedly emphasized the importance of meeting the deadline. Correcting the mistake would require informing several people that earlier calculations need to be reconsidered.

The employee fears being regarded as responsible for a delay, even though the mistake originated elsewhere.

They consider allowing the report to proceed.

It would be unfair to examine this decision without recognizing the conditions surrounding it. People do not always possess the same freedom to raise concerns. An employee who has previously witnessed retaliation against colleagues may have substantial reasons for caution.

The organization bears responsibility for creating an environment in which accurate information can be communicated without unreasonable personal risk.

Nevertheless, the employee’s difficulty illustrates how a pressure that is immediately visible can overshadow consequences that are more distant.

They know who is waiting for the report. They know how their manager may respond to another delay. They may know very little about the people who will rely upon the inaccurate information later.

The people absent from the room can become less significant in a decision than the people capable of making the present uncomfortable.

Where circumstances permit, the employee might seek a second opinion, raise the matter through an appropriate channel or document the uncertainty rather than silently treating the report as reliable.

There may be no entirely safe option.

That is why evaluating a choice requires attention both to the person making it and to the conditions under which it must be made.

We should not congratulate organizations for relying upon extraordinary personal courage to obtain information that ordinary procedures ought to make possible.

The moral comfort of agreeing with our own group

A woman listens as several relatives discuss a family disagreement.

They describe the behavior of someone who is not present. Because she knows and loves the people speaking, their account initially seems sufficient. She finds herself repeating a claim about the absent relative without knowing how it originated.

Later, she hears a different version of the events.

Some of the original claims were accurate. Others were incomplete, and one had been repeated so many times that nobody could identify the person who first made it.

She realizes that her desire to remain loyal had influenced what she was willing to believe.

There is nothing inherently wrong with loyalty. Relationships often depend upon a willingness to trust people, support them through difficulty and resist unfair criticism directed against them.

But loyalty becomes dangerous when it requires us to treat the interests of people outside the relationship as less deserving of consideration.

We may find it easy to identify the harm caused by an opposing group and difficult to acknowledge similar conduct among people with whom we identify.

The published letter An Open Letter to Those Who Confuse Stability With Justice considers how the preservation of an established arrangement can be mistaken for fairness. Within close relationships, a similar confusion can arise when avoiding disagreement becomes more important than examining the consequences of what we collectively accept.

The woman does not need to abandon her family to reconsider the claim she repeated.

She can distinguish between caring about the people who told her a story and declaring everything in that story reliable.

Sometimes a more demanding form of loyalty involves helping people recognize what their own account has left out.

The difference between a mistake and a refusal to reconsider

A person may make a harmful decision because important information was unavailable.

They may misunderstand another person’s needs, underestimate a risk or choose an arrangement that appeared reasonable at the time.

When new information becomes available, a different kind of decision presents itself.

Can the original choice be reconsidered?

Suppose a teacher establishes a rule intended to make classroom discussions more orderly. After several weeks, quieter students explain that the procedure makes it difficult for them to participate. The teacher had not anticipated the problem.

The original decision deserves to be examined, but its meaning will also depend upon what happens next.

The teacher could investigate the difficulty and revise the procedure. Or they could interpret the complaints as a challenge to their authority and insist that the students learn to adapt.

The second response involves information the first decision did not possess.

Not every complaint establishes that an arrangement ought to change. There may be competing needs, practical constraints or evidence unavailable to the person raising the concern.

But a willingness to consider that evidence is important precisely because we cannot expect ourselves to anticipate every consequence of a decision.

Maya could not change the fact that she had allowed the application to proceed with an inaccurate record.

She could decide whether the woman’s letter would become another item to process or information that required her to reconsider what she had done.

The quality of our judgment is not revealed exclusively in the decisions we make before discovering a mistake.

It is also revealed in the decisions we make after discovering one.

Responsibility does not require a permanent identity of shame

There is a difficulty in admitting that we have done something harmful when our understanding of ourselves depends heavily on being considered good.

A person may become so frightened of what an admission appears to establish about their character that they devote more attention to defending themselves than to the circumstances of the people affected.

They may emphasize their intentions, describe previous occasions on which they behaved generously or search for a comparable mistake made by someone else.

Those responses can preserve a familiar identity without addressing the present problem.

There is also an opposite danger. Someone may regard a serious failure as evidence that everything worthwhile about their character was an illusion. Their attention becomes concentrated on their own shame, and they struggle to identify actions that could reduce the harm.

Neither defense nor self-condemnation necessarily produces repair.

Responsibility begins more concretely.

What happened? What part did our decision play? What consequences remain? What can reasonably be repaired, and what needs to change to reduce the likelihood of repetition?

These questions do not guarantee forgiveness. A person affected by harm may have no desire to resume a relationship. They may be entitled to seek restitution, protection or accountability through established procedures.

Our wish to understand ourselves more generously cannot determine what another person owes us.

In What Makes a Life Worth Remembering?, we considered how other people are entitled to interpret the effects of our conduct. Accepting that reality allows us to take responsibility without making the entire process dependent upon restoring our preferred reputation.

A person capable of doing something wrong may also be capable of recognizing it and acting differently.

The second possibility does not undo the first.

It gives the future a different direction.

The letter she answered

Maya reopened the application.

She found the document, confirmed when it had been received and brought the discrepancy to the attention of the person responsible for reviewing the case. She explained her earlier decision rather than pretending that the error had only just become visible.

The application still required a formal review. There were procedures she could not bypass, and she did not promise an outcome she lacked the authority to determine.

But she wrote to the woman with an accurate account of what had been found and what was being done next.

She also raised a question at a departmental meeting about how missing documents were recorded and corrected. Several colleagues described similar difficulties. A change to the procedure was discussed.

It was not an impressive act of moral transformation. Maya continued to work in an imperfect environment. She would continue encountering choices whose consequences were not completely clear.

What mattered was that the discomfort of discovering her mistake had not become a reason to leave it undisturbed.

We make poor choices for many reasons. We become tired. We fear losing something. We protect relationships, gain advantages, follow familiar examples or allow an immediately convenient explanation to replace a more demanding examination of the situation.

Sometimes those pressures are substantial. Sometimes we possess more freedom than we are willing to acknowledge.

Understanding human behavior requires us to leave room for that difference.

But understanding is not an alternative to accountability.

Perhaps goodness is less useful as a description we attach permanently to ourselves than as an aspiration that needs to remain open to examination. It asks something of us when the answer is inconvenient, when another person’s account challenges ours and when a decision we once considered harmless becomes more difficult to defend.

Maya could not recover the weeks the woman had spent waiting.

She could stop asking the woman to carry the consequences of an error she was now able to address.

The envelope remained on her desk.

This time, beside it, there was a reply.

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