The Wisdom of Not Knowing

A literary reflection on the wisdom of not knowing, the limits of certainty, and how intellectual humility can guide responsible decisions when answers remain incomplete.

An open archaeological field notebook and pottery fragments beside sunlit ancient stone ruins.

On the morning the excavation began, a woman named Lillian stood beside a wall that had belonged to the old town hall.

She had spent much of her working life examining buildings whose histories were poorly documented. The council had asked her to establish when the wall had been constructed before a new public garden was laid out around it.

An early map suggested that it had formed part of a nineteenth-century extension. Several pieces of stone appeared to be older. A local historian believed that the builders had reused material from a house that once occupied the neighboring property.

A journalist arrived shortly before lunchtime and asked Lillian how old the wall was.

She explained what the available evidence suggested.

Then she said that she did not yet know.

The journalist appeared disappointed. He had hoped to publish a description of the discovery that afternoon, and a definite date would have made the account considerably easier to write.

Lillian understood his difficulty. She would have liked a definite date herself.

But the wall had stood there for longer than either of them could remember, and there was no particular benefit in assigning it an age merely because somebody had arrived with a notebook.

Later that afternoon, a worker uncovered a small section of brickwork beneath the stones. It complicated the explanation Lillian had been considering.

She was pleased to see it.

There are forms of knowledge that become possible because somebody has been willing to leave a question unanswered for a little longer. There are also forms of judgment that depend upon recognizing that some questions will remain unanswered even when a decision can no longer be postponed.

The wisdom of not knowing lies somewhere between these two circumstances.

It does not consist in admiring ignorance. It consists in understanding what our uncertainty permits us to conclude, what it requires us to investigate, and what we can responsibly do before it has been resolved.

The answer that arrives before the evidence

At a bookshop, a man named Richard was responsible for deciding which publications should be displayed near the entrance.

One month, sales declined noticeably. Richard concluded that the arrangement of the display had become too familiar to regular customers. He asked a colleague to replace the books and reorganize the shelves.

Sales remained low.

He then learned that construction work on a nearby road had reduced the number of people walking past the shop. Several regular customers had begun entering the neighborhood from another direction.

The first explanation Richard had offered was not particularly implausible. It was simply an explanation whose accuracy he had not established.

There is a certain comfort in acquiring a reason for a difficulty as soon as the difficulty becomes apparent. A reason provides something to discuss and often suggests an action we can take. It allows us to feel that an unfamiliar circumstance has acquired a recognizable form.

The problem is that a convincing explanation can sometimes reduce our interest in obtaining the information necessary to assess it.

In Why We Judge What We Do Not Understand, we considered how readily people can reach conclusions about circumstances whose important features they have not yet examined.

A similar difficulty arises when a person is under pressure to respond quickly to a practical problem.

The ability to supply an explanation can be mistaken for evidence that the explanation is correct.

Richard could have regarded the display as one possible reason for the decline in sales. He could have compared the number of customers entering the shop with the number making purchases, spoken to neighboring businesses or examined whether the decline affected particular times of the day.

Some of these inquiries might have been unnecessary had his first explanation been correct.

But they would have helped him distinguish an observation about the business from a conclusion about its cause.

There is no need to suspend every judgment until an exhaustive investigation has been completed. Ordinary life would become unmanageable if we insisted upon establishing the cause of every minor inconvenience before responding to it.

What matters is the degree of confidence appropriate to the available information and the consequences of acting upon it.

An inexpensive experiment that can easily be reversed may require relatively little evidence. A decision that creates substantial costs for other people deserves considerably greater care.

The uncertainty Richard initially experienced was not an obstacle to the inquiry.

It was information about the condition in which the inquiry needed to begin.

The questions we ask when somebody else is uncertain

A young woman named Hannah received an offer of employment in a town she had visited only twice.

The position interested her, although she knew relatively little about the character of the organization and the people with whom she would work.

Her family wanted to help.

One relative told her that she would regret declining the opportunity. Another believed she should remain closer to home. A friend assured her that everything would eventually become clear once she had made the decision.

These responses were offered with affection.

They did not necessarily address the questions Hannah was attempting to resolve.

She wanted to know whether the position would allow her to undertake the kind of work described in the advertisement. She needed to establish whether accommodation would be manageable on the proposed salary. She wanted information about the working hours and the amount of support available during the first months.

Some uncertainty could be reduced through inquiries. Other uncertainty belonged to experiences she could obtain only by accepting the position.

There was little reason to treat both kinds as though they could be resolved by the same conversation.

As explored in The Weight of the Choices We Never Made, an important decision often involves consequences whose precise character cannot be known in advance.

The desire to reassure somebody can tempt us to make promises about those consequences that we have no means of fulfilling.

Perhaps the person will enjoy their new occupation. Perhaps they will discover that it is poorly suited to them. We may have reasons to consider one outcome more likely than another, but affection does not give us special access to the future.

A useful response may begin by asking what information would actually make the decision easier.

It may involve helping somebody identify the risks they can reasonably manage, the alternatives that would remain available, or the commitments that would be difficult to reverse.

Hannah’s aunt eventually offered to accompany her on another visit to the town.

They examined several neighborhoods and spoke about the practical arrangements associated with moving.

The aunt did not attempt to decide whether Hannah would be happy there.

She helped her obtain enough information to make a more considered decision about whether to go.

The authority to admit a limitation

At a small engineering firm, a senior employee named Marcus was asked to comment on an unfamiliar fault in a piece of equipment.

The people present expected him to provide an explanation. He had been working in the industry for many years and had successfully resolved a considerable number of difficult problems.

Marcus examined the equipment.

Then he explained that he was not sufficiently familiar with one of its components to establish what had caused the fault. He recommended that the equipment remain out of service until someone with the appropriate knowledge had examined it.

A younger employee was surprised.

He had assumed that acquiring considerable experience meant gradually reaching a position in which admitting uncertainty would no longer be necessary.

Marcus’s response revealed a different understanding of experience.

Part of developing expertise involves recognizing which of our observations support a conclusion and which do not. It involves being able to distinguish a problem we understand from one that merely resembles problems we have encountered before.

The person who possesses limited knowledge may not yet recognize the significance of a difference between two apparently similar situations.

The more experienced person may recognize precisely why that difference makes an immediate answer inappropriate.

In The Difference Between Knowing and Understanding, we considered why having access to information is not always equivalent to grasping the circumstances in which it matters.

An honest acknowledgment of uncertainty can be an expression of that understanding.

It would nevertheless be inadequate for Marcus simply to say that he did not know and return to his other work. He was responsible for ensuring that the difficulty received an appropriate response.

His acknowledgment needed to be accompanied by practical decisions about the equipment, the information that should be recorded and the expertise required to investigate further.

This distinction is important wherever other people rely upon our judgment.

We do not fulfill a responsibility merely by being candid about our limitations. But candor can help us fulfill it more safely and accurately.

The younger employee subsequently accompanied the specialist who examined the equipment.

He learned something about the fault.

He had already learned something about the work.

What we cannot discover by thinking about it again

Several years after Lillian’s husband died, she found a brief letter among the documents he had kept in a drawer.

It concerned a possible change of employment that he had considered before they met.

The letter gave little indication of how seriously he had regarded the opportunity. Lillian remembered him mentioning the organization occasionally, but she could not remember a conversation in which he had explained why he eventually decided against working there.

At first, the absence of an explanation bothered her.

She reread the letter and attempted to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the decision. She wondered whether he had wanted to move elsewhere or whether the work simply appeared less attractive after further investigation.

There was very little additional information to obtain.

After a time, she recognized that she was attempting to settle a question whose answer might no longer be available.

There are uncertainties we can reduce by continuing an inquiry. A document can be located, a measurement repeated or a person with relevant knowledge consulted.

There are others for which the difficulty does not concern an insufficient amount of thought.

The evidence may have disappeared. The experience may have belonged to a person who is no longer available to describe it. Several explanations may remain plausible without there being a dependable means of establishing which one is accurate.

As considered in The Things We Cannot Explain to Each Other, the histories through which experiences acquire their significance are not always entirely accessible to the people who wish to understand them.

We can take those histories seriously without pretending that all of their details are recoverable.

Lillian could retain the letter as part of her husband’s history. She could consider what little it revealed about the opportunities that had once been available to him.

She could also leave some of its questions unanswered.

The act of doing so did not remove her interest in the life he had lived before they met.

It allowed her to distinguish that interest from a demand that every surviving object provide a complete explanation of the circumstances in which it had been acquired.

Making a decision without a guarantee

A community organization had received funding to establish a small program for adults who wanted to improve their reading skills.

The person responsible for organizing it, a woman named Judith, wanted to understand which arrangements would be most useful to the people likely to participate.

She consulted several local groups and spoke to people with experience of similar programs. She learned that some participants would prefer evening sessions while others needed classes during the day.

The available funding would not support every proposed arrangement.

Judith would eventually need to decide which sessions to offer.

There is a difficulty in making decisions under conditions in which further information might reveal that another arrangement would have been more useful.

The possibility of discovering a mistake can make continued preparation appear preferable to action.

Yet postponing a decision also has consequences. People who might have benefited from the program remain without it. Funding may be lost, and the circumstances on which an earlier proposal depended may change.

The reasonable response to uncertainty is not always another investigation.

Sometimes it is an arrangement that acknowledges what remains unknown.

Judith decided to organize a limited initial program and establish clear opportunities for participants to explain which features were useful and which created difficulties. She recorded the reasons for the timetable and retained sufficient flexibility to alter some of the arrangements.

The decision was not a declaration that she had discovered the ideal form of the program.

It was a way of beginning under circumstances in which the ideal form could not yet be established.

Not every undertaking allows this degree of flexibility. Some decisions have serious consequences that cannot be reversed, and the conditions under which they are made may demand extensive preparation.

Others permit us to learn through a carefully limited beginning.

Recognizing the difference can make it easier to decide what kind of certainty an undertaking actually requires.

Judith knew that some people would be unable to attend the first sessions. She tried to make that limitation visible rather than present the timetable as a solution to every difficulty.

The program began.

Several weeks later, she knew considerably more about the people it was intended to serve.

Some of that knowledge had become available only because she had been willing to begin before possessing it.

When uncertainty becomes an excuse

A supervisor discovers that several workers have raised concerns about the same piece of equipment.

He explains that he cannot yet establish whether a serious problem exists.

The statement may be accurate.

But the absence of a definite conclusion does not necessarily justify continuing as though the equipment has been established to be safe.

There are situations in which uncertainty itself has practical significance. The possibility of serious harm may provide a reason for precaution before the precise nature of a difficulty becomes known.

Similarly, a person whose conduct has repeatedly caused difficulties for others cannot always avoid examining it by claiming that its consequences are impossible to establish with complete accuracy.

We rarely possess perfect information about every effect of our actions.

Nevertheless, we may possess enough information to recognize that a concern deserves attention, that a particular arrangement is unreasonable or that further investigation is necessary.

It is therefore worth distinguishing honest uncertainty from the selective demand for certainty that sometimes appears when an available conclusion is inconvenient.

Are we asking for more information because it would help us understand a question?

Or are we asking for a degree of proof we would not have required had the information supported the arrangement we preferred?

There is no simple test that will settle this distinction in every circumstance.

But examining how consistently we apply our standards of evidence can reveal something about the work those standards are performing.

The supervisor might not know whether the equipment contains a particular fault.

He can still take the reports seriously, seek appropriate assistance and ensure that the people using it are not expected to absorb risks he has not adequately investigated.

Acknowledging what we do not know should increase our attention to the responsibilities that remain.

It should not make those responsibilities disappear.

The date beneath the stone

By the time excavation around the town hall was completed, Lillian had identified evidence that supported a more complicated account of the wall than any of the original proposals.

Some of the material appeared to have belonged to an earlier building. Other sections had been reconstructed at a later date. The available evidence did not establish the precise year in which every part of the structure had been assembled.

She wrote a report explaining these distinctions.

The journalist returned.

This time, he asked what could reasonably be said about the discovery.

Lillian showed him the sections of the wall whose histories could be established with greater confidence. She described the parts that remained uncertain and explained why the evidence did not support a single date.

They spent some time discussing what had been learned.

Perhaps wisdom sometimes consists in resisting the pressure to make an answer more complete than the knowledge upon which it depends.

We can pursue questions seriously without supposing that every question has an answer available to us. We can make decisions with care without claiming to know all their consequences. We can recognize a limitation without treating it as a permanent reason to remain inactive.

There will be occasions when obtaining more information is essential, and occasions when further thought cannot provide what the surviving evidence does not contain.

We can try to recognize the difference.

And when other people depend upon our judgment, we can be clear enough about the limits of our knowledge that they have an opportunity to understand those limits as well.

The new garden eventually opened.

Beside the wall was a small sign describing the history of the structure and the evidence uncovered during the excavation.

It did not contain a definite date for every stone.

It contained a more accurate account of the wall than the town had possessed before.

Lillian thought that was a worthwhile result.

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