The Courage to Change Our Minds

A literary reflection on changing our minds, revisiting beliefs with intellectual humility, admitting mistakes responsibly and knowing when a conviction deserves to stand.

The Courage to Change Our Minds — a historic railway station beside tracks stretching toward a misty sunrise.

At the public meeting, Margaret gave three reasons why the old railway building should be demolished.

It was expensive to maintain. Its position near the town center made the land valuable. And, she argued, the money required to preserve it could be spent on facilities that would serve considerably more people.

She had made the same argument on several previous occasions. People who agreed with her had begun asking whether she would speak at meetings where the proposal was discussed.

Then a survey arrived.

The building was in better condition than the council had initially been told. A local organization had offered to contribute to its restoration, and an alternative site had been identified for the facilities Margaret supported.

She read the documents twice.

The case she had made was no longer quite the case she believed.

That evening, somebody telephoned to ask whether she could repeat her speech at another meeting.

Margaret could easily have found something else to criticize about the old building. No proposal of that kind was without difficulties. She could have continued defending her original conclusion by assembling a different argument for it.

What she found more difficult was explaining to people who had supported her that some of the reasons for their agreement no longer seemed adequate.

The courage to change our minds is not always the courage to discover something new. Sometimes it is the courage to make that discovery visible to people who remember what we said before.

When an opinion acquires a history

A belief can begin as a response to a question and gradually acquire a much larger place in our lives.

We express it in conversations. We defend it against objections. We make decisions based upon it, and sometimes develop relationships with people who appreciate that we hold it.

The belief then becomes associated with an account of who we are.

A teacher who has spent years recommending a particular method may be known among colleagues for her commitment to it. A parent who has defended a certain approach to raising children may have offered advice to relatives who now remember those conversations.

Reconsidering an opinion in such circumstances can involve more than assessing whether the opinion is accurate.

It can involve acknowledging that some of our previous advice may have been incomplete. We may discover that people whose objections irritated us had a better understanding of certain aspects of the question than we were willing to recognize.

There may also be practical consequences. Somebody might have made a decision in reliance on information we provided. An organization may have devoted resources to a course of action we advocated.

These consequences are reasons to approach reconsideration carefully. They are not, by themselves, evidence that the original opinion deserves to survive.

In The Things We Refuse to Admit, we considered how an uncomfortable truth can threaten the arrangements through which we understand ourselves. A changing belief can reveal a similar tension between our desire to make accurate judgments and our desire to remain recognizable, both to ourselves and to other people.

Margaret had not simply expressed an opinion about a building. She had acquired a reputation as someone capable of explaining why the building should not remain.

That reputation was now making it more difficult for her to discuss the question on its merits.

The difference between an explanation and an excuse

Imagine a manager who has concluded that a particular employee is careless.

Several deadlines have been missed. A report has been submitted with significant omissions. The manager has discussed the employee’s performance with other members of the organization and has begun considering whether disciplinary action is appropriate.

Then she discovers that two departments have independently been assigning the employee urgent work without communicating with one another.

The missed deadlines remain a problem. The incomplete report still needs to be corrected.

But the explanation for these events has changed.

The manager could say that a more capable employee would have found a way to handle the competing demands. Perhaps there are aspects of the employee’s response that deserve examination. Nevertheless, continuing to treat the original explanation as sufficient would leave an organizational difficulty unaddressed.

There is a recognizable temptation to move an argument whenever the information supporting our first conclusion becomes less convincing.

We begin by saying that a person has failed because they did not work hard enough. When we discover that they have worked exceptionally hard, we say that they should have worked differently. When we learn that they did not have the authority to make the necessary changes, we criticize them for not obtaining that authority.

Some of these criticisms might independently be reasonable. The question is whether we would have reached them had we not already decided what sort of person we were examining.

In Why We Judge What We Do Not Understand, we explored what happens when an explanation becomes settled before sufficient attention has been given to the circumstances it is intended to explain.

A useful test is to ask whether the same information would have led us to the same conclusion if we had encountered it in a different order.

The answer may not be obvious. But the question can expose how much of a judgment depends on the work we are doing to preserve it.

What an earlier version of ourselves could reasonably know

There are occasions when people reconsider a decision and immediately begin criticizing the person they were when they made it.

They ask why they did not recognize a difficulty sooner, why they trusted a piece of advice or why they accepted an explanation that now seems plainly incomplete.

Sometimes the criticism is justified. There are situations in which people ignore available warnings because those warnings conflict with something they want to believe.

But not every mistaken conclusion was unreasonable when it was reached.

A family choosing a place to live may consider the information available about transport, employment and local services. Several years later, a change to public transport makes the arrangement far less convenient. The family can acknowledge that a different choice would now serve them better without pretending the later information was available at the time.

The same distinction applies to judgments about other people, institutions and events.

We can examine whether our previous conclusions were proportionate to the evidence we possessed. We can also recognize that new information sometimes changes a question without revealing a previous failure of care.

As we discussed in The Difference Between Knowing and Understanding, information often acquires significance through the context in which it is considered.

Margaret had been given an assessment of the railway building that indicated restoration would require substantial expenditure. She had not invented that assessment. It was reasonable for her to take it seriously.

What mattered now was whether she would grant the subsequent assessment the same consideration.

Treating every revision as an admission of incompetence can create an incentive to retain conclusions beyond the point at which they remain defensible.

There is a more useful distinction to make: whether we paid appropriate attention to the information we had, and whether we are willing to pay appropriate attention to the information we have now.

The people who remember our certainty

At the next meeting, Margaret began by describing the new survey and the financial offer from the local organization.

She explained that several of her earlier concerns had been addressed, although she still believed the restoration proposal needed a realistic estimate of its continuing costs.

Some people listened carefully. One man asked whether the information meant the council could preserve the building without abandoning its other plans.

Another person appeared annoyed.

He reminded Margaret that she had previously described the project as an irresponsible use of public money. He had distributed a summary of her arguments among his neighbors.

Margaret understood his irritation. Her revision had created work for somebody who had taken her earlier position seriously.

She did not tell him that he should have known she might change her mind. She acknowledged that she had spoken with greater certainty than the original assessment warranted.

Changing an opinion publicly can require attention to the people affected by its earlier expression.

A correction offered quietly may be inadequate when the original assertion was made before a large audience. If somebody has used inaccurate information to influence decisions, the seriousness of the consequences may require more than a general statement that their perspective has evolved.

But acknowledging those consequences need not involve agreeing to remain mistaken for the convenience of everyone who previously agreed with us.

The people who supported our earlier judgment are entitled to an explanation. They are not entitled to require that we maintain it regardless of what we subsequently learn.

There is a risk of disappointment in admitting that we no longer hold a particular view.

There is also a risk in making the trust people have placed in us a reason to offer them information we no longer believe is adequate.

When refusing to change is the responsible choice

Not every objection provides a reason to revise a belief.

A worker may be pressured to withdraw a complaint about an unsafe condition. A person who has established a boundary in a difficult relationship may be told repeatedly that they are unreasonable. An institution may be encouraged to reconsider a fair policy chiefly because its requirements are inconvenient to people with substantial influence.

In these circumstances, retaining a judgment can require considerable courage.

The willingness to reconsider our opinions should not be confused with the obligation to accommodate every person who disputes them.

There is a difference between a challenge supported by relevant information and a challenge whose principal force comes from the social or practical consequences of resisting it.

The distinction is not always easy to establish. A criticism may be delivered unpleasantly and still contain something worth examining. A sympathetic person may offer an argument that is not particularly convincing.

It can help to separate the question of what an objection establishes from the question of who has made it.

The worker can ask whether the new information actually demonstrates that the condition is safe. The person confronting pressure within a relationship can examine whether their boundary remains reasonable without treating another person’s frustration as decisive evidence against it.

In The Contradictions Within Us, we explored the difficulty of holding different commitments without allowing one to erase the importance of another. Here, the commitments are to openness and to the independence of our judgment.

Neither requires that we abandon the other.

The aim is not to become a person whose opinions can always be changed.

It is to become a person whose reasons for holding an opinion remain available for examination.

The decisions that require another person to pay for our revision

A man tells his business partner that he has reconsidered a commitment they made several years earlier.

He no longer wants to continue the enterprise. His interests have changed, and the work has become more demanding than he expected.

His partner accepts that he cannot be compelled to retain the same ambitions indefinitely. She also points out that the commitments they made together have created responsibilities that cannot simply disappear because his preferences have changed.

There are occasions when a revision of belief or intention is necessary but does not resolve the obligations arising from our earlier choices.

A parent may change their understanding of an educational decision after a child has already been affected by it. An organization may abandon a policy that caused avoidable difficulty for its employees. A person may recognize that an accusation they made against somebody was mistaken.

In such cases, the new understanding matters partly because it changes what we ought to do next.

An apology may be appropriate. An arrangement may need to be renegotiated. Somebody affected by an inaccurate statement may deserve a correction that reaches the people who originally heard it.

The precise response will depend on the nature of the undertaking and the harm involved.

It would be unreasonable to insist that a person never revise a commitment simply because other people have relied upon it. It would also be unreasonable to treat intellectual openness as a general exemption from responsibility.

Changing our minds can be the beginning of taking responsibility rather than the conclusion of that responsibility.

The business partners may need to discuss a sale, a transition period or another arrangement through which the consequences of the change are distributed fairly.

The new decision deserves attention. So does the history within which it has been made.

Leaving a little room in our sentences

Several months after the railway meeting, Margaret found herself discussing another proposal concerning the town’s public spaces.

She had read the relevant documents and formed a preliminary opinion.

This time, when somebody asked whether she supported the plan, she explained which elements appeared sensible to her and which questions she believed had not yet been answered.

There was no particular virtue in making her response vague. Where she possessed good reasons for a conclusion, she stated them.

But she tried to distinguish the things she knew from the assumptions on which some of her conclusions depended.

There is a practical advantage to making those distinctions before a disagreement occurs.

When we say what would count as a reason to reconsider a judgment, we make it easier for other people to provide information that might actually be relevant. We also reduce the difficulty of acknowledging that information if it subsequently becomes available.

A person need not attach a qualification to every ordinary assertion. Certain facts are well established, and some decisions require us to act before all possible uncertainties have been resolved.

Nevertheless, there are questions about which our confidence exceeds the quality of the information we possess.

Leaving room for clarification can be especially useful in those circumstances.

It may mean saying that a proposal appears impractical under the arrangements currently described, rather than declaring that it could never work.

It may mean distinguishing what we observed another person doing from what we have inferred about their motives.

It may mean explaining that our conclusion depends on a figure we have not independently verified.

Such language does not necessarily weaken an argument. It can make an argument more useful by revealing how it was constructed.

The building that remained

The town eventually agreed to a more limited restoration of the railway building than its most enthusiastic supporters had originally proposed.

Some rooms were opened for public use. Other sections remained unavailable while further funding was sought.

Margaret visited one afternoon when an exhibition of photographs had been arranged in the former waiting room.

She did not regard the existence of the exhibition as proof that every aspect of the restoration had been wise. The building would continue to require maintenance, and future decisions would need to be assessed in light of their costs.

But she was glad that the opportunity had not been dismissed merely because it conflicted with the argument she had once made.

Perhaps an important part of intellectual maturity is learning to recognize that our previous opinions belong to our history without necessarily belonging to our future.

They may contain valuable observations. They may reveal assumptions that deserve examination. Some will remain convincing after decades of consideration, while others will become less useful as our circumstances or understanding change.

We can take responsibility for what we have said without treating the continuation of every earlier judgment as a condition of our integrity.

And we can recognize that a person who changes an opinion carefully has not necessarily become less dependable.

Sometimes they have simply demonstrated that their commitment to understanding a question is greater than their commitment to being remembered as someone who answered it correctly the first time.

Margaret stayed in the waiting room for a while.

Among the photographs was one taken when the railway was still in operation.

She had never seen it before.

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